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Cartel agreements between firms typically aim at reducing competition and increasing joint 
profits. Due to the fact that such agreements regularly cause substantial economic harm in the 
form of, e.g., elevated prices and reduced innovation activities, cartels are a major 
infringement of competition laws in most countries around the world. After the breakdown of 
cartels, anecdotal evidence often points towards an increased merger activity in the respective 
industries thereby raising the question whether mergers must be considered as a potential 
‘second-best’ alternative to cartels.  
 
Against this background, we investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. 
Merging information on cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) between 
2000 and 2011 with a detailed data set of worldwide merger activity, we find that, first, the 
average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when comparing the 
three years before the cartel breakdowns with the three years afterwards. Second, for the 
subset of horizontal mergers, merger activity is found to increase even more – by up to 83 
percent – after the cartel breakdowns. Our results not only suggest that competition authorities 
should consider mergers as potential ‘second-best’ alternative to cartels but also imply that 
resource (re)allocations in competition authorities, law practices and economic consultancies 





















Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Kartellabsprachen zwischen Wettbewerbern zielen typischerweise darauf ab, den 
herrschenden Wettbewerb zu reduzieren und gleichzeitig die Unternehmensgewinne zu 
erhöhen. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass solche Vereinbarungen regelmäßig großen 
ökonomischen Schaden in Form von beispielsweise erhöhten Preisen oder reduzierten 
Innovationsaktivitäten verursachen, stellen sie weltweit einen schwerwiegenden Verstoß 
gegen die entsprechenden Kartellgesetze dar. Nach dem Zusammenbruch von Kartellen hat 
man verschiedentlich beobachtet, dass in den jeweils betroffenen Industrien die 
Fusionsaktivitäten angestiegen sind und daraus die Frage abgeleitet, ob Fusionen 
möglicherweise eine ‚second-best’ Alternative zum (gerade zusammengebrochenen) Kartell 
darstellen können.  
 
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersuchen wir den Einfluss von Kartellzusammenbrüchen auf die 
Fusionsaktivitäten. Durch die Zusammenlegung von Informationen über alle von der 
Europäischen Kommission zwischen 2000 und 2011 abgeschlossenen Kartelluntersuchungen 
mit einem detaillierten Datensatz weltweiter Fusionsaktivitäten finden wir, dass die 
durchschnittliche Anzahl an Fusionen nach einem Kartellzusammenbruch um bis zu 51 
Prozent ansteigt (vergleicht man auf Branchenebene die drei Jahre vor dem Zusammenbruch 
des Kartells mit den drei Jahren danach). Betrachtet man lediglich horizontale Fusionen, so 
findet man sogar Anstiege in der Fusionsaktivität von bis zu 83 Prozent. Unsere Ergebnisse 
legen nicht nur nahe, dass Wettbewerbsbehörden Fusionen als mögliche ‚second-best’ 
Alternative zu Kartellen betrachten sollten, sondern implizieren ebenso, dass Umschichtungen 
bzw. Erweiterungen von Ressourcen in Wettbewerbsbehörden, Kanzleien und ökonomischen 
Beratungsgesellschaften notwendig werden können, um den Anstieg an Fusionsfällen im zur 
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We investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. Merging information on 
cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) between 2000 and 2011 with a 
detailed data set of worldwide merger activity, we find that, first, the average number of all 
merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when comparing the three years before the 
cartel breakdowns with the three years afterwards. Second, for the subset of horizontal 
mergers, merger activity is found to increase even more – by up to 83 percent – after the cartel 
breakdowns. Our results not only suggest that competition authorities should consider 
mergers as potential ‘second-best’ alternative to cartels but also imply that resource 
(re)allocations in competition authorities, law practices and economic consultancies may 
become necessary to handle the increase in merger cases.       
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1. Introduction 
Cartel agreements between firms typically aim at reducing competition and increasing joint 
profits. Due to the fact that such agreements regularly cause substantial economic harm in the 
form of, e.g., elevated prices and reduced innovation activities, cartels are a major 
infringement of competition laws in most countries around the world. After the breakdown of 
cartels, anecdotal evidence1 often points towards an increased merger activity in the respective 
industries thereby raising the question whether mergers must be considered as a potential 
‘second-best’ alternative to cartels.  
 Generally, such a potential substitute relationship between cartels and mergers is not a 
recently gained insight. On the contrary, after cartelization was prohibited by the Sherman 
Act in the United States in 1890, companies started to merge with their rivals thereby 
contributing to the development of the first great merger wave (see Bittlingmayer (1985) or 
Mueller (1996)). After realizing that mergers became a ‘second-best’ alternative to cartels – 
as part of the general desire of firms to increase market power and reduce competitive 
pressures – law makers in the US reacted by the adoption of the Clayton Act in 1914 which 
introduced – among other procedures – an ex-ante merger control aiming at prohibiting (or 
remedying) mergers with anticompetitive potential.  
 Although nearly a century has passed by since the birth of merger control, the underlying 
key motivations are still valid and relevant. Both national and international cartels still exist 
and mergers remain a threat for (re)gained competition after the detection of such serious 
infringements of competition law. Although modern merger control procedures are likely to 
foreclose the implementation of the most anticompetitive mergers (e.g., between former 
cartelists), merger reactions to cartel breakdowns must still be considered as both possible and 
desirable, first and foremost due to their potential role in reducing competitive pressures in 
the post-cartel world.    
 Against this background, we investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger 
activity. Merging information on cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) 
between 2000 and 2011 with a detailed data set of worldwide merger activity, we find that, 
first, the average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when 
comparing the three years before the cartel breakdowns with the three years afterwards. 
                                                          
1  For example, Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano (2013) report a case from the French local urban transport 
markets where two of the three cartelists announced their intent to merge in the aftermath of the detection 
and punishment of an illegal market sharing agreement. From a historical perspective, Kumar et al. (2012) 
present descriptive evidence of merger activity after collusive episodes in the ten largest US manufacturing 
industries around the time of the adoption of the Sherman Act in 1890. Interestingly, they find evidence of 
post-cartel merger activity in eight out of the ten industries. 
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Second, for the subset of horizontal mergers, merger activity is found to increase even more – 
by up to 83 percent – after the cartel breakdowns. Our results not only suggest that 
competition authorities should consider mergers as potential ‘second-best’ alternative to 
cartels but also imply that resource (re)allocations in competition authorities, law practices 
and economic consultancies may become necessary to handle the increase in merger cases.      
 The paper is structured as follows. The subsequent second section sheds light on the 
interaction between cartelization and merger activity. In addition to a general characterization 
of cartels and mergers, we particularly study merger activity before and after a cartel 
breakdown. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis. Subsequent to the detailed description 
of the construction of the data set in Section 3.1, we subdivide the reporting our empirical 
results into two sub-sections. While Section 3.2.1 concentrates on all mergers after cartel 
breakdowns, Section 3.2.2 redoes the analysis for the subset of horizontal mergers. Section 4 
concludes the paper with a review of the key insights and the derivation of several important 
policy implications. 
  
2. Interaction between cartelization and merger activity 
In this section, we discuss the interaction between cartelization and merger activity from a 
mostly theoretical perspective. While the following Section 2.1 provides a brief general 
characterization of cartels and mergers, the subsequent Section 2.2 specifically focuses on an 
economic assessment of the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity.  
 
2.1. General characterization of cartels and mergers 
In this section, we briefly discuss the key motivations for cartel and merger formation 
followed by an assessment of their impacts on economic welfare.2   
 
2.1.1. Cartels 
A hard-core cartel (‘cartel’ in the following) is typically defined as “… a group of firms who 
have agreed explicitly among themselves to coordinate their activities in order to raise market 
price – that is, they have entered into some form of price fixing agreement” (Pepall et al., 
2001, p. 345). The types of agreement that typically lead to such an increase in market price 
include not only price fixing agreements in the literal sense but also bid-rigging (collusive 
tenders), output restrictions and quotas, allocation of customers, suppliers, territories, and 
lines of commerce (see, e.g., Crampton, 2003, p. 5). 
                                                          
2  This section partly follows Hüschelrath (2009). 
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 From a business perspective, firms have an incentive to form cartels because coordinating 
the respective competitive activities leads to greater profits than acting independently. The 
basic rationale for this allegation lies in the internalization of a negative externality. In a 
competitive market, a firm is simply interested in how much a reduction in its own output 
benefits itself, while it ignores the (positive) effect that a reduction in output has on the profits 
of the other firms in the market (via the reduction in total market output and the 
corresponding increase in price). A cartel internalizes this effect by taking into account how 
changes in the output level of each firm affect joint cartel profits (see Carlton and Perloff, 
2004, p. 122 for a detailed treatment). As a consequence, the cartel benefits from reducing 
total output below the competitive level and thereby increasing joint profits.  
 Although the identified incentives for cartelization can be considered as omnipresent, the 
respective costs and benefits in engaging in such agreements differ substantially between 
markets. The underlying economic reasons are twofold. On the one hand, the profit 
differential between the cartel profit and the competitive profit – i.e., “the difference between 
the most profitable outcome possible for the firms (the best possible Nash equilibrium) and 
the worst” (Whinston, 2006: 40) – depends on the specifics of the market and market 
interaction. On the other hand, the same is true for the costs of operating a cartel – i.e., 
reaching and monitoring cartel agreements, and possible antitrust fines and damages – which 
might become prohibitively high in certain constellations.  
 In fact, theoretical research has identified an ample number of so-called collusion factors 
which have the potential to influence the benefits and costs – and therefore the rationality and 
stability – of cartels and collusion. Rey (2006) – in accordance with many other 
commentators on the topic – subdivides these factors into structural, supply-related and 
demand-related factors. Structural factors that ease collusion include a low number of 
competitors, high entry barriers, frequent interaction between firms and market transparency. 
Demand-related factors include market growth, absence of significant fluctuations or business 
cycles, low demand elasticity, buying power and the absence of club and network effects. 
Finally, supply-related factors which ease collusive agreements include mature industries 
(with stable technologies), symmetric costs, symmetric capacities, product homogeneity, 
multi-market contact, structural links and various forms of contractual agreements. The 
theoretical reasoning upon which these different collusion factors are based can be found, for 
instance, in Rey (2006), Motta (2004), Ivaldi et al. (2003) and Grout and Sonderegger (2005). 
 Given our discussion of the business motivations for cartel formation, an assessment of the 
welfare effects is a straightforward exercise: a perfectly functioning cartel – involving all 
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firms in the market and referring to substitute products – is expected to lead to the same 
market outcome as a monopoly and therefore causes similar allocative, productive and 
dynamic inefficiencies. Additionally, cartels usually do not create any benefits to society 
which could be traded off against the anticompetitive effects from an antitrust perspective. As 
a consequence, contemporary cartels are a prime example for a per se prohibition in most 
jurisdictions around the world irrespective of the particular characteristics of the industry, 
product or type of agreement. 
 
2.1.2. Mergers 
A merger is generally defined as the act (or process) of combining two or more existing 
companies into one new company.3 More specifically, mergers are typically categorized with 
respect to the position of the merging companies in the value chain (i.e., the production and 
distribution chain) of a certain product or service. Applying this logic, a horizontal merger 
takes place between two or more parties operating at the same level of the value chain for a 
certain product. A vertical merger, however, involves companies from different levels of the 
value chain of a certain product or service leading to either upward or downward vertical 
integration. The third and final category of mergers is the conglomerate merger, which 
involves two or more firms operating in different value chains (see ICN, 2006: 10ff. for a 
detailed discussion).  
 The literature studying the business motivations of mergers has grown to an impressive 
size (see Tichy, 1990, 2001, or DePamphilis, 2003: 19ff. for surveys). Although motivations 
partly diverge with merger type (see Mueller, 2004: 66ff.), the most fundamental and unifying 
reason to merge is the expectation to increase profits in some way. 4 The channels of how a 
merger can lead to such profit increases are again diverse, reaching from an increase in 
market power (which would allow price increases) via the realization of cost efficiencies 
(which would lead to lower production costs and therefore competitive advantages), up to a 
reduction of management inefficiencies via a market for corporate control (which would lead 
to the acquisition and restructuring of suboptimally managed firms). Further merger 
                                                          
3  In the remainder of this paper, we refrain from differentiating between mergers and acquisitions. From an 
antitrust perspective, all that counts is the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking by 
controlling a substantial part of its assets (and the corresponding voting rights). While a merger certainly 
fits into that category, the effect of an acquisition depends on the respective scope of investment. 
4  A complementary strand of research on the motives for mergers deviates from the assumption that mergers 
aim at maximising profits and instead explains merger activity by behavioural theories. Tichy (2001: 368) 
differentiates this group of merger explanations into approaches in which the manager incorrectly believes 
to be better able to manage the target (hubris hypothesis); the manager believes in the superior quality of 
management’s investment decisions relative to those of the shareholders (free cash flow hypothesis); and 
the manager acts to get personal advantages (empire-building hypothesis).  
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motivations include financial distress, retirement or the realization of tax advantages (see 
Viscusi et al., 1997: 202).  
 From a welfare perspective, at first sight, there seems to be no fundamental difference 
between cartels and (horizontal) mergers. Whether two firms in a three-firm industry form a 
cartel or merge seem to make, ceteris paribus, no fundamental difference from a welfare point 
of view. However, there are at least two basic justifications why mergers should be treated 
differently. First, from an economy and industry level perspective, mergers and acquisitions 
are an important instrument for facilitating changes in industry structures, which may have 
become necessary because of technological changes, globalization, commoditization, low or 
high growth, chronic excess capacity, fragmentation, price volatility, demand shifts, new 
entries or deregulation (see Weston, 2001: 397, for the complete list as well as industry 
examples). 
 Second, from a product market perspective, mergers differ from cartels because mergers 
regularly contain the possibility of increasing welfare by the realization of so-called merger 
efficiencies. One prominent way to realize such efficiencies by a horizontal merger is 
generally through cost efficiencies, such as economies of scale or economies of scope, which 
allow the merged company to produce the product(s) cheaper than before the merger. An 
alternative source of such efficiencies may be realized via the combination of R&D assets, 
which allows an easier knowledge transfer and greater research output (probably combined 
with a reduction in fixed costs).  
 Taking such efficiencies into account leaves a (horizontal) merger with basically two 
opposite potential welfare effects: On the one hand, the inevitable increase in market 
concentration contains the imminent danger of making post-merger price increases profitable. 
If the underlying welfare standard is consumer surplus, such a price increase post-merger 
would allow the conclusion that the merger is reducing welfare. On the other hand, the 
creation of merger-specific efficiencies would allow the merged entity to reduce costs and to 
increase their profits. Consequently, it is the key aim of merger control procedures 
implemented in many jurisdictions around the world to evaluate the possible costs and 
benefits of mergers (reaching a certain minimum size) on a case-by-case basis and to make a 
decision on whether to approve or prohibit the respective transaction.5   
 
                                                          
5  In principle, the same cost-benefit assessment applies to vertical mergers although the respective alleged 
pro- and anti-competitive effects partly differ. While pro-competitive effects include the avoidance of 
double marginalization or a reduction in quality-related free riding, potentially anti-competitive effects are 
(input or customer) foreclosure or an increased likelihood for collusion post-merger. 
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2.2. Merger activity before and after a cartel breakdown  
Based on the isolated characterization of cartels and mergers in the previous section, this 
section continues with a discussion of the interaction of both competitive strategies in general 
and merger activity before and after a cartel breakdown in particular. Existing research 
focusing on these questions is quite limited. From a theoretical perspective, Mehra (2007) 
sees cartels and (horizontal) mergers as alternative arrangements to increase profitability and 
argues that the choice between the two forms is determined by factors such as the structure of 
industry, organization of firms, and, last but not least, existing antitrust laws. In a conjectural 
variation model, she shows that in the absence of cartel fines, a firm always prefers a cartel to 
merger, when the latter does not involve any efficiency gains. She further shows that when 
there is perfect competition among the competitive fringe, firms do not have incentives to 
form a cartel and they merge only if there are efficiencies involved.  
 In a recent paper, Kumar et al. (2012) are searching for explanations why – despite the 
inherent stability problems – firms might still prefer cartels over mergers. In addition to 
explanations relating to the reduced capital requirements for cartels compared to mergers 
(Stigler 1950)6 or expected diseconomies from merger (Bittlingmayer 1985), they show that 
such a behaviour can be rational (i.e., profit-maximizing) as long as customers are uncertain 
as to whether non-merged firms are operating as a cartel or not.      
 From an empirical perspective, Bittlingmayer (1985) provides evidence for a substitute 
relationship between cartels and mergers for the United States. Inspired by the observation 
that companies started to merge with their rivals after cartelization was declared illegal by the 
Sherman Act in 1890 – culminating in the first big merger wave – he particularly investigates 
the question why firms preferred cartelization over merging in the first place. Starting from 
the observation that many cartelized industries were characterized by high fixed costs, a small 
number of firms and cyclical demand, he argues that cartels simply were a cheaper form of 
organization compared to mergers – partly because coordination was only needed in times of 
low demand. Inspired by the work of Bittlingmayer, Kumar et al. (2012) present further 
descriptive evidence of merger activity after collusive episodes in the ten largest US 
                                                          
6  This is particularly true if it is considered that cartels typically (have to) include most (or even all) larger 
firms in the respective industry (in order to make it a profitable endeavour) while mergers typically take 
place between two firms only, i.e., while cartels allow a coordination of competition parameters among 
most or even all major players, mergers typically refer to a substantially smaller market share in the 
respective industry. Even if capital constraints are assumed to be non-binding, it would still be difficult in 
the short and medium run to implement a couple of subsequent mergers among all those major players in 
the respective industry (which would be necessary to mimic the market performance of a cartel).  
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manufacturing industries around the time of the adoption of the Sherman Act. Interestingly, 
they find evidence of substantial post-cartel merger activity in eight out of the ten industries.  
 Turning from the review of the sparse existing literature to a general assessment of the 
interaction between cartel breakdowns and mergers, in the following, we assume the existence 
of both cartel and merger enforcement in a certain jurisdiction and concentrate on particularly 
two periods in the cartel lifecycle: during cartelization and after cartelization. The ‘during 
cartelization’ period starts with the implementation of a cartel agreement. As cartels can only 
be considered as stable if most (larger) firms are participating in it, reduced incentives to 
merge can be expected. However, mergers might still take place (a) between cartelists, e.g., in 
order to discipline a cartel breaker, (b) between cartelists and non-cartelists, e.g., in order to 
acquire a firm which refused to join the cartel or (c) between (smaller) non-cartel members, 
e.g., in an attempt to bundle powers against the cartel.  
 The ‘after cartelization’ period certainly is the most crucial one for the purposes of our 
study. Several qualitative arguments speak for a general increase in merger activity after a 
cartel breakdown. First, the breakdown of the cartel must be understood as a shock for the 
respective industry in the sense that cartel-related structures (and profits) are gone thereby 
implying a detailed thinking on suitable ‘second-best’ strategies to regain profitability. While 
horizontal mergers can be an important tool to improve the relative position of the acquirer in 
the post-cartel world, vertical mergers might aim at securing important input goods 
(upstream), important customer channels (downstream), or might facilitate upstream collusion 
in the post-cartel world (see, e.g., Nocke and White, 2007, and Bittlingmayer 1985). Second, 
due to the end of the cartel, less efficient firms might run into financial problems making 
them suitable targets for an acquisition by competitors (and causing structural changes in the 
industry). Third, after the cartel breakdown, cartel breakers may be acquired as a measure of 
punishment (possibly in an attempt to either reinstate the cartel or switch to some form of tacit 
collusion afterwards).  
 Despite all these arguments for an increase in merger activity after cartel breakdowns, it is 
important to remark that the interaction between cartels and mergers can also be inverted in 
the sense that in the process of merging two companies, an involvement in a cartel is detected 
by the merging firms and subsequently reported – often under the leniency program – to the 
competition authority.7 Although the European Union (EU) has experienced several of such 
cases in the past, it is on the one hand reasonable to assume that the majority of cartels are 
still detected by alternative methods. On the other hand, even if a particular merger has been 
                                                          
7  We are thankful to Stephan Simon (European Commission, Brussels) for pointing this out to us.  
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the trigger for a cartel breakdown, most of the arguments for an increased merger activity 
mentioned above stay valid thereby still suggesting an increase in merger activity in the post-
cartel world. 
   
3. Cartel breakdowns in the European Union and merger activity 
In this section, we study the relationship between EU cartel breakdowns and subsequent 
merger activity. We start in Section 3.1 with a detailed description of the construction of the 
data set followed by the presentation of our empirical results in Section 3.2. In a first step, we 
investigate the number of all merger transactions in the three years before and after the cartel 
breakdowns in the respective industries (Section 3.2.1), followed by conducting the same 
analysis for the subset of horizontal mergers in a second step (Section 3.2.2). 
 In both sections, we differentiate between three types of geographical scope of the 
mergers. In addition to an investigation of worldwide merger activity, we also report the 
respective results for the subsets of mergers in which either one EEA (European Economic 
Area) firm was involved or in which both parties were based in the EEA. Although it is 
reasonable to assume that the effect of European cartel breakdowns on mergers is strongest 
within the EEA, the still growing internationalization of markets does not rule out the 
possibility that a European cartel breakdown might motivate, e.g., a Canadian and an US firm 
to merge their businesses.  
 
3.1. Construction of the data set 
The backbone of any empirical investigation of the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger 
activity is the construction of a suitable data basis. The data set used in this article was 
constructed by two separate raw data sets.  
 
Data set on EC cartel case decisions between 2000 and 2011 
The first data set contains information on all cartel cases decided by the European 
Commission between 2000 and 2011. The data were collected from decisions and press 
releases published by the EC in the course of its investigations and combine case-specific as 
well as firm-specific information. On the case level, information such as cartel type, cartel 
duration, number of cartel members, affected industry, relevant geographic market(s) and 
imposed overall fines are available. Regarding firm-specific data, we have information on the 
individual length of cartel participation, the level of fines imposed by the EC, whether the 
firm applied for leniency and the value of fine reductions following a successful leniency 
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application. Furthermore, specific factors that are relevant for the calculation of the fine such 
as, e.g., aggravating and mitigating circumstances or repeated offenders are available. In sum, 
the data set combines information on 73 EC cartel cases and 464 cartel members.8 Table 1 
displays an excerpt of the descriptive statistics of the data set.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the cartel raw data set  
  Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Number of firms per case  5.73 5 3.38 2 17 
Cartel duration (total, in months) 101.91 74 77.94 3 419 
Cartel duration (firm specific, in months) 89.16 70.5 66.79 3 419 
Total fine per case (m  €) 207.32 108.61 263.37 0.45 1383.9 
Individual fine per firm (m  €) 36.19 11.55 79.78 0 896 
Fine reduction per firm  0.236 0.1 0.311 0 1 
Share of leniency cases  0.926 1 0.26 0 1 
Leniency collaboration rate per case 0.685 0.75 0.327 0 1 
 
As shown in Table 1, the average number of cartel firms is 5.73 and the average overall cartel 
duration is 102 months (8.5 years). The median values of both factors are 5 firms and 74 
months (6.17 years), respectively. The average firm-specific length of cartel participation is 
89 months (7.43 years), which is close to the overall cartel duration and suggests that cartels 
are generally stable in terms of the number of participating firms.   
 Regarding cartel fines, the average fine per case imposed by the European Commission 
between 2000 and 2011 amounts to 207 million €. It varies between 450,000 € imposed in the 
Luxembourg brewer case and 1.38 billion € in the Car glass cartel. 93 percent of the cases 
show leniency applications and, on average, 68.5 percent of the firms in each case applied for 
fine reductions as part of the program. The average fine reduction per firm – which is not 
necessarily due to a leniency application but could also relate to, e.g., the inability to pay 
larger fines – is 24 percent of the initial base fine imposed. 
  
Data set on worldwide merger activity between 1997 and 2013 
For the study of merger activity, we make use of the ZEPHYR database provided by Bureau 
van Dijk. The ZEPHYR database includes detailed information on (completed) worldwide 
mergers and acquisitions such as deal type, transaction volume as well as target, acquirer and 
vendor financials and further details. In our raw data set, we do not include all transactions 
from ZEPHYR but restrict the number of deals according to the following selection 
                                                          
8  It is worth noting that one cartel member is not necessarily represented by one single firm in our data set. In 
cases in which several firms are jointly liable for the infringement, such a ‘group of companies’ is treated as 
one observation. 
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procedure. First, we use information on cartel-affected industries from our cartel data set and 
only keep all completed mergers or acquisitions from these industries at NACE three- or four-
digit level. Second, we only keep information on industries for which merger information was 
available three years before and after the respective cartel breakdowns. Third, we drop 
industries in which several cartels emerged in the observation period in order to avoid a 
problematic overlapping of observations.9 Applying these selection criteria leaves us with 
5244 mergers related to 24 industries on NACE three- or four-digit level. Table 2 displays an 
excerpt of the descriptive statistics of this data set. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the merger raw data set  
  Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Mergers  0.010 0 0.101 0 1 
Acquisitions  0.990 1 0.101 0 1 
Deal value (m  €) 322.660 13.765 4625539 0.01 189951 
Mergers with EEA involvement  0.161 0 0.368 0 1 
Mergers within EEA only  0.373 0 0.484 0 1 
Mergers outside EEA 0.423 0 0.494 0 1 
Horizontal M&A  0.331 0 0.471 0 1 
Vertical or conglomerate M&A 0.669 1 0.471 0 1 
 
As shown in Table 2, 99 percent of the transactions refer to acquisitions leaving only 1 
percent for pure mergers. The average and median deal values are 323 million € and 14 
million €, respectively. The highest deal value is 190 billion € and was paid as part of the 
merger between Smithkline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome in 2000. The geographical 
breakdown of the data reveals that about 16 percent of the observations refer to mergers in 
which at least one firm originates from the EEA, while 37 percent represent transactions 
within the EEA and 42 percent of the mergers and acquisitions took place outside the EEA.10 
Last but not least, Table 2 reveals that 33 percent of the mergers and acquisitions in the data 
set were horizontal leaving the remaining 67 percent for either vertical or conglomerate 
mergers.11  
 
                                                          
9  For example, if a cartel in a particular industry ended in 2002 and another cartel in the same industry in 2006, 
the number of transactions in 2005 in this industry would be assigned to both categories ‘three years after 
cartel breakdowns’ and ‘one year before cartel breakdowns’ in our empirical analysis. As such an overlap 
would bias our results we only keep industries in which either only one cartel emerged in the observation 
period or in which the time distance between two cartels is sufficiently large to avoid the described overlap. 
10  The remaining five percent are transactions for which the originating country of either the acquirer or the 
target is not stated in the ZEPHYR database. Please note that these observations are dropped for the analysis 
of EEA mergers in the subsequent sub-sections. 
11  As ZEPHYR does not provide information on the type of transaction, we define a merger as horizontal if the 
primary 4-digit NACE codes of the acquirer and the target are identical. 
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Merging the two raw data sets 
The two data sets were merged via industry three- or four-digit NACE codes, resulting in an 
overall data set that contains cartel and merger data for 24 industries on a yearly basis. We 
provide an overview of the respective industries (including the NACE code) in Table 5 in the 
Annex. Furthermore, Table 3 below provides a characterization of the 22 cartels included into 
our analysis.  















37512 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 8 9/1989 2/1999 113 
37750 Manufacture of beer / Wholesale of beverages 2 3/1996 12/1999 45 
37800 Manufacture of beer 4 10/1985 2/2000 172 
37956 Manufacture of doors and windows of metal 7 12/1989 7/2000 127 
37978 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2 11/1990 12/1999 109 
38279 Wholesale of meat and meat products 6 10/2001 1/2002 3 
38344 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-
alloys 
16 1/1984 9/2002 224 
38354 Manufacture of plastic packing goods 13 1/1982 6/2002 245 
38432 Manufacture of consumer electronics 3 8/1999 5/2002 33 
38543 Other transportation support activities 10 10/1984 9/2003 227 
38645 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and 
profiles 
5 1/1997 9/2002 68 
38823 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment / 
Other construction installation 
4 5/1996 1/2004 92 
38899 Manufacture of electricity distribution and 
control apparatus 
5 4/1988 5/2004 193 
39092 Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures / 
Manufacture of other plastic products / 
Manufacture of other taps and valves 
17 10/1992 11/2004 145 
39125 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles / Sale of motor vehicle parts and 
accessories 
4 3/1998 3/2003 60 
39129 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and 
transformers 
6 6/1999 5/2003 47 
39165 Manufacture of flat glass 4 1/2004 2/2005 13 
39309 Manufacture of computers and peripheral 
equipment 
6 10/2001 2/2006 52 
39396 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 
/ Other non-ferrous metal production 
7 4/2004 1/2007 33 
39401 Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 2 1/1980 8/2000 247 
39579 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning 
and polishing preparations 
3 1/2002 3/2005 38 
39600 Manufacture of other pumps and compressors 5 4/2004 10/2007 42 
 
In addition to the case number of the corresponding EC cartel decision, we further report the 
respective industry, number of cartelists, begin and end of the cartel as well as the resulting 
cartel duration (in months). As implied by the table, we were only able to include 22 out of 73 
EC cartels (about 33 percent) which were decided between 2000 and 2011 in our empirical 
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analysis. While several cases had to be dropped due to missing data, the majority had to be 
excluded due to cartel overlaps, i.e., we excluded the industry as soon as an overlap of two or 
more cartels was identified. This process was necessary in order to correctly identify the 
effect of one cartel breakdown on merger activity.  
 
3.2. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. The subsequent Section 3.2.1 
concentrates on all kind of mergers (horizontal, vertical and conglomerate) while Section 
3.2.2 then restricts our analysis to horizontal mergers only. In both sub-sections, we provide 
the results for three different geographical scopes of mergers: worldwide mergers, mergers in 
which one EEA firm was involved and mergers in which both parties were based in the EEA. 
 
3.2.1. Results for all mergers 
Although market power issues are typically assumed to be strongest for horizontal mergers, 
the discussion in Section 2.2 above revealed that especially vertical (but also conglomerate) 
mergers have the potential to change the structure of the post-cartel industry and may lead to 
increases in market power. In a first step, we therefore report the number of all merger 
transactions in the three years before and after the cartel breakdowns in the respective 
industries12 for the three geographical scopes. 


















                                                          
12  The yearly distances 1, 2 and 3 are based on monthly time spans, i.e. [1;12], [13;24] and [25;36] months 
after cartel breakdowns. The same definition applies to the distances before the cartel breakdowns (-1, -2 
and -3). 
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(a) Geographic scope: worldwide 
 
 
(b) Geographic scope: at least one merging firm stems from EEA 
 
 
(c) Geographic scope: both merging firms stem from EEA 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of merger transactions and their median values three years 
before/after cartel breakdowns (all mergers) 
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As revealed by Figure 1(a), we observe a clear increase in merger activity in the three years 
after the cartel breakdowns (compared to the three years before the cartel breakdowns). 
Although a stepwise increase in merger activity is already identifiable in the three-year-
window before the cartel breakdowns, the average number of transactions still increases from 
696 in the three years before to 1052 in the three years after the cartel breakdowns; a rise of 
about 51 percent.   
 Extending our analysis to the remaining two geographical scopes shown in Figure 1(b) and 
1(c) reveals that – despite the expected reduction in the number of transactions – the general 
shapes of the pre-/post-cartel breakdown values stay quite similar; although the percentage-
changes are reduced to 25 percent (EEA firm involved) and 28 percent (only EEA firms 
involved), respectively. However, while Figure 1(a) still shows an additional small increase in 
worldwide merger activity in the year +3, activity stays almost constant for mergers with EEA 
involvement (Figure 1(b)) and even decreases in the sub-sample of EEA mergers (Figure 
1(c)). However, in sum, our descriptive results support the hypothesis that merger activity 
increases in the year after cartel breakdowns in the cartel-affected industries leading to a 
corresponding increase in the average number of merger transactions in the three years after 
the cartel breakdowns.  
 With respect to changes in the median deal values over time, we observe a remarkable drop 
in transaction size in the year after the cartel breakdowns in all three graphs, suggesting that a 
larger number of smaller mergers is realized in that period. This decrease in the median 
transaction value is, however, followed by an up-and-down pattern in the succeeding two 
years making any consistent interpretation difficult. Furthermore, the three graphs in Figure 1 
also reveal that absolute median values are located between EUR 15 million and EUR 35 
million suggesting that a substantial fraction of all mergers in the dataset are rather small 
transactions.13  
 
3.2.2. Results for horizontal mergers only 
Although a cartel breakdown might also motivate vertical and conglomerate mergers, it is 
reasonable to expect that horizontal mergers are the primary candidate; basically because, by 
definition, the respective cartels referred to the horizontal level and it is therefore reasonable 
to assume that the desire to merge is strongest on this horizontal level in the post-cartel world. 
                                                          
13  In this respect, it is important to mention that restricting the dataset to only those transactions in which at 
least 50 percent of the target firm was acquired (thereby dropping smaller transactions) reveals an almost 
identical pattern, i.e., our general results are not driven by the fact that a substantial amount of small 
transactions is included. The number of transactions, however, does differ quite substantially.   
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In order to investigate this hypothesis, Figure 2 below provides the above results for the 


































(a) Geographic scope: worldwide 
 
 
(b) Geographic scope: at least one merging firm stems from EEA 
 
 
(c) Geographic scope: both merging firms stem from EEA 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of merger transactions and their median values three years 
before/after cartel breakdowns (horizontal mergers only) 
 
17  
As revealed by Figure 2(a), we observe an even more pronounced increase in merger activity 
in the three years after the cartel breakdowns (compared to the three years before the cartel 
breakdowns). While the stepwise increase in merger activity in the years before the cartel 
breakdowns – identified in Figure 1(a)) – is reduced or even disappears, the average number 
of transactions increases substantially from 196 in the three years before to 359 in the three 
years after the cartel breakdowns; a rise of about 83 percent.   
 Extending our analysis to the remaining two geographical scopes shown in Figure 2(b) and 
2(c) reveals that – despite the expected reduction in the number of transactions – the general 
shapes of pre-/post-cartel breakdown values stay quite similar, although the percentage-
changes are reduced to 48 percent (EEA firm involved) and 66 percent (only EEA firms 
involved), respectively. Again, while Figure 2(a) shows an additional small increase in 
merger activity in year +3, activity is visibly reduced in Figures 2(b) and 2(c). However, in 
sum, our descriptive results support the hypothesis that horizontal merger activity increases 
substantially in the years after cartel breakdowns in the cartel-affected industries leading to a 
corresponding increase in the average number of merger transactions in the three years after 
the cartel breakdowns.  
 With respect to changes in the median deal values over time, we observe a remarkable 
increase in transaction size in the year before the cartel breakdowns in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) 
and already in year -2 in Figure 2(c). Although increases in the median value suggests that a 
number of larger mergers were realized in the respected period, the developments reported in 
the figures are again difficult to interpret without a detailed case-based assessment of the 
respective mergers.  
 In a nutshell, comparing the average number of merger transactions and percentage 
changes between Figure 1 (all mergers) and Figure 2 (horizontal mergers only) reveals a 
substantial increase in post-cartel merger activity for both breakdowns of the data set. 
However, as expected up-front, results for the subset of horizontal mergers are much clearer 
compared to the entire data set including all merger transactions. Table 4 below summarizes 
the key results by providing the average number of merger transactions and percentage 







Table 4: Average number of merger transactions and percentage changes three years 
before and after the cartel breakdowns 
 Average number of transactions 
 All mergers Horizontal mergers 




















696 1052 +51.2 196 359 +83.2 
At least one merging firm 
stems from EEA 414 522 +25.1 129 188 +45.7 
Both merging firms  
stem from EEA 275 351 +27.6 76 126 +65.8 
 
As shown in Table 4, the percentage change in the average number of transactions lies 
between 25 percent for all mergers in which at least one merging firm stems from the EEA 
and 83 percent for worldwide horizontal mergers. Although admittedly part of these 
differences might be driven by other factors, the dimension of the observed changes together 
with the different points in time at which the cartels ended provide a strong case for a direct 
relationship between cartel breakdowns and merger activity. 
 
3.3. Challenges of an econometric implementation 
Given the substantial investment in the construction of the data set applied in this study, the 
original plan was to complement the descriptive evidence presented in the previous sections 
with econometric evidence on the question whether cartel breakdowns lead to a significant 
increase in merger activity. In particular, we aimed at applying either a difference-in-
differences approach or a before-during-after approach to substantiate our analysis. Despite 
the undisputed general value of such econometric investigations, we decided to abstain from 
them in this paper for the following reasons.  
 In principle, a difference-in-differences approach would be a suitable empirical method to 
investigate our research question. In addition to substantial data needs, a key challenge in an 
application of such a method lies in the choice of a suitable control group. For several 
reasons, we believe that such a suitable control group cannot be identified in our case. First, 
cartels are not equally likely in all markets and industries and as a consequence, it would be 
necessary to include industries in which cartels are in principle possible. Second, even if such 
industries can be identified, they would face the challenge of containing undetected cartels 
thereby questioning these industries as suitable control group. Third, our data set only 
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includes cartels detected on the level of the European Union and therefore ignores the 
(potentially substantial) impact of either national cartels in the EU or international cartels 
outside the EU (which might still have an impact on European markets).  
 Complementary to a difference-in-differences approach, a before-during-after approach 
could be applied. In principle, such an approach could explain merger activity before, during 
and after cartelization while controlling for other drivers such as the general economic 
development, interest rate levels or more specific trends in particular industries (which might 
determine general merger activity). In addition to possible methodological problems of such 
an approach (e.g., due to overlaps between different cartels at a particular point in time 
causing severe identification problems), an application as part of this study is foreclosed due 
to a lack of sufficiently detailed data.  
 Despite the described challenges of an econometric implementation – which led to the 
decision not to undertake them as part of this study – we do believe that the findings derived 
as part of our descriptive empirical analysis provide a strong case for an existing impact of 
cartel breakdowns on merger activity. Although admittedly part of the observed differences 
might be affected by other drivers such as, e.g., general waves in the economic development, 
the fact that the cartel breakdowns included in our analysis took place at different points in 
time is likely to reduce the impact of such effects on our key results.     
 
4. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the breakdown of a German cement cartel in early 2002, one of the large 
former cartel members tried to acquire the cartel breaker – Readymix AG – probably in an 
attempt to both ‘pacify’ the industry and punish the deviator. The German Federal Cartel 
Office, however, prohibited the transaction thereby avoiding the (partial) substitution of 
cartel-related market power by merger-related market power. In the end, Readymix was 
nevertheless acquired – by Cemex, a larger Mexican cement company which was not active in 
the German market before the transaction.  
 Although admittedly anecdotal evidence, the aftermath of the breakdown of the German 
cement cartel provides a nice example of the interaction between cartel breakdowns and 
merger activity in a world with workable antitrust enforcement. The breakdown of the cartel 
led to an increased desire to merge and antitrust policy was – albeit able to foreclose the 
(likely) most anticompetitive merger – not in the position to entirely prohibit subsequent 
mergers in the post-cartel world. More generally, the case suggests that modern antitrust 
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policy certainly can have an influence on the choice of the merging parties, however, is 
typically unable to disrupt the general incentives to merge after a cartel breakdown.    
 Against this background, we have investigated the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger 
activity. Merging information on cartel cases decided by the European Commission between 
2000 and 2011 with a detailed data set of worldwide merger activity, we find that, first, the 
average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when comparing the 
three years before the cartel breakdowns with the three years afterwards. Second, for the 
subset of horizontal mergers, merger activity is found to increase even more – by up to 83 
percent – after the cartel breakdowns. Our results stay largely robust for variations in the 
geographical scope (worldwide, EEA firm involved, only EEA firms involved). Although 
several methodological (and data) problems did not allow us to put our descriptive results on 
the econometrics test bed, we do believe that they provide a strong case for an existing impact 
of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. 
 Due to the limitations of our empirical analysis, policy conclusions should be derived with 
care. In principle, our results on the one hand suggest that competition authorities should 
consider mergers as a potential ‘second-best’ alternative to cartels, i.e., they should take the 
prior collusion history of the industry into account during the merger control procedure (in 
order to avoid a simple replacement of the type of market power). On the other hand, our 
finding that cartel breakdowns are followed by an increased merger activity also implies that 
resource (re)allocations in competition authorities, law practices and economic consultancies 
may become necessary to handle the respective increase in the workload.  
 Last but not least, our study points towards two interesting future research areas. On the 
one hand, the observed merger activities suggest additional research on ex-post merger 
assessments that explicitly take a prior collusion history into account. Such studies would 
allow detailed answers to the question whether approved mergers in the respective industries 
should in fact had been prohibited or – more generally – whether merger control in such 
cartel-affected industries should become tougher in order to increase the probability that 
competition has ‘a fair chance’ to grow. 
 On the other hand, although merger activity after cartel breakdowns can be motivated by 
anticompetitive purposes, it is reasonable to assume that a substantial fraction of these 
transactions rather follow efficiency motivations; e.g., post-cartel mergers might play an 
important role in facilitating the transition from old and inefficient cartel industry structures to 
more efficient competitive market structures. As a consequence, a fruitful area of future 
research is detailed case studies on such transition processes in general and the role of 
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mergers in particular. Such investigations are especially likely to provide answers to one key 
question this study had to leave open: the true motivations underlying the identified 
substantial increase in merger activity after cartel breakdowns.      
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Table 5: Industries included in the empirical analysis 
Industry NACE Code 
Manufacture of beer 1105 
Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations 2041 
Manufacture of other chemical products nec 2059 
Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles 2221 
Manufacture of plastic packing goods 2222 
Manufacture of other plastic products 2229 
Manufacture of flat glass 2311 
Other non-ferrous metal production 2445 
Manufacture of doors and windows of metal 2512 
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 2711 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 2712 
Manufacture of other pumps and compressors 2813 
Manufacture of other taps and valves 2814 
Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 2822 
Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles 2932 
Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 3522 
Other construction installation 4329 
Wholesale of meat and meat products 4632 
Wholesale of beverages 4634 
Other transportation support activities 5229 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 212/2120 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 241/2410 
Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 262/2620 
Manufacture of consumer electronics 264/2640 
 
 
